US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01471.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH01471}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 19C  To Sea in a Headquarters Ship}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{island
kwajalein
landing
beach
troops
support
japanese
attack
assault
january}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 19C  To Sea in a Headquarters Ship

     On 8 January 1944, COMPHIBPAC, his staff and the Headquarters of
Commander Support Aircraft embarked in the Rocky Mount (AGC-3).  The initial
reaction was that the ship was wonderful.  But by the time the staff had
shaken down, and the Commander, Fifth Amphibious Corps and his staff had come
aboard, it was apparent that there were problems in the communication
equipment - primarily interference between the many, many radio sets and
radars needed and used simultaneously.

     These ships, which drew their "AGC" designation from a type
classification of "Auxiliary General Communication Ship," were a beehouse of
radio transmitters and receivers set among a forest of radars.

     Only one other Headquarters Ship, the Appalachian (AGC-1), was available
in the Central Pacific for the Marshall Island campaign.  This fell to Rear
Admiral Conolly.

     Rear Admiral Hill had shifted his flag on 6 January 1944 from the
Maryland to a transport fitted as a flagship, the Cambria (APA-36).  It will
be remembered that the Cambria had been a standby flagship for Rear Admiral
Turner prior to the Gilbert Islands operation, and perhaps was the best of the
transport flagships.

Rehearsals

     Rehearsal for the Southern Attack Force was held at Maalaea Bay, Maui and
nearby Kahoolawe Island on 13-16 January 1944.  Rehearsals by the Northern
Attack Force were held at San Clemente Island, California, on 2-3 January
1944, almost a month before the actual assault.  Rear Admiral Turner later
wrote:

. . . In the final rehearsals of the Northern Attack Force, it was possible to
assemble part, but not all, of the supporting combatant forces . . . .  Only a
small proportion of the supporting carrier aircraft were available . . . .
For the rehearsal of the Southern Attack Force, it was possible to make but
one troop landing, and one additional partial debarkation of troops into boats
for a simulated landing . . . .  Part of the aircraft operated from shore
instead of carrier decks, thus creating artificial conditions.

     Again, it was the aircraft which were short-changed in the rehearsals.

Approach to the Marshalls

     The main body of Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, with
nearly 300 ships and 54,000 assault troops embarked, departed from Pearl for
Flintlock operations on 22 January 1944.  The Northern Attack Force had sailed
from San Diego, California, on 13 January, stopping off at Lahaina Roads,
Maui, for fueling on 21 January.  The LST's of the Northern Attack Force, with
their precious amtracs had sailed from San Diego on 6 January, while the
amtrac-bearing LST's of the Southern Attack Force sailed from Pearl Harbor on
19 January 1944.

     On 14 January 1944, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area had
issued a chart showing Japanese air searches from the Marshalls, based on
intercepted Japanese radio traffic.  This chart showed the Japanese were
searching to 700 miles to the south and south-southeast from the eastern
Marshalls (where the air attacks against them were coming from) but only 350
miles to the east and northeast.  This influenced the choice of the approach
route for Flintlock forces, which was made from the north-northeast.

     According to Rear Admiral Turner's operational report:

The voyage from the Hawaiian Area to the objective was almost without
incident.  One sound contact was reported by the Screen on January 30th
. . . .  It is believed all units of the Expeditionary Force reached their
objectives without being detected by the enemy.

     The most alarming event on the passage to the objective in the Southern
Attack Force occurred when at 1925 on the evening before the initial assault,
the battleship Pennsylvania suddenly opened anti-aircraft fire.  Most
fortunately, no Japanese plane was around to spoil the surprise party of the
on-rushing Expeditionary Force.  And when things were quieted down the
amphibians' War Diary noted:

     Pennsylvania reported firing done by excited man.

     The Northern Attack Force had its first moment of travail long before Dog
minus one.  On the passage from San Diego to Hawaii, the LST's encountered
very rough weather the night of 11- 12 January.  Some of the amtracs got loose
on the tank decks of the LST's, the LST's became scattered and the LST-122 did
not rejoin the formation until arrival at Nawiliwili Bay on the southeast
coast of Kauai in the Hawaiian Islands on 17 January 1944.

     The advance guard of the Northern Attack Force had another moment of
travail on 28 January 1944.  The Lavalette (DD-448), escort between Hawaii and
Kwajalein Atoll for the Initial Tractor Group (TG 53.7), made a radar contact
at 18 miles with an unidentified aircraft at 280910 and tracked the plane for
some minutes.  Haze and low clouds made sight contact impossible.  On this
date, the Japanese had only four search aircraft operating daily from the
Marshalls in a quadrant between 060 to 110 from Taroa to a distance of 600 or
700 miles.  These planes had no radar, but our forces did not know that.

     According to a despatch to Commander Expeditionary Force from CINCPAC, a
Japanese plane made a contact on the next day at 291250 with something located
at 11 degrees 17 minutes N, 171 degrees 23 minutes E.  This was about 100
miles northeast of Wotje Atoll.  TG 53.7, the Northern Tractor Group (LST's),
was at 11 degrees 27 minutes N, 171 degrees 08 minutes E, at 1250 on 29
January, reasonably close to this position.

     Surprisingly, the Japanese took no offensive action against the Northern
Tractor Group.  But it is worth noting that again it was the slow moving LST's
which offered the Japanese the opportunity for first knowledge of the approach
of the amphibians.

On Target

     The battleships in the Southern Attack Force logged picking up Kwajalein
Atoll by radar a few minutes after midnight on 30 January 1944 at ranges from
18 to 20 miles.

Southern Attack Force Landings - The First Move At Night

     A great many ships logged a strong set to the south and southwest as they
moved in close to Kwajalein Atoll.

     Two APDs, the Overton and Manley, designated the Channel Island Transport
Group, had the difficult chore of landing a reconnaissance party and follow up
troops on a dark night on Gea Island and Ninni Island just to the northwest of
Kwajalein Island.  The Overton was under orders to land her party on Ninni
Island and the Manley, her party on Gea Island.  Gea Island was about nine
miles northwest of Kwajalein Island and Ninni Island was just a bit further
northwest on the far side of Gea Pass Channel leading into the southern part
of Kwajalein Lagoon.  The destroyer transports were under orders to land their
first wave of reconnaissance troops at "about 0330" on 31 January 1944 from
rubber boats on the seaward beaches.  Subsequent follow-up troops were to land
from regular personnel landing craft a few minutes later.

     The two converted destroyers did not even come close to accomplishing
their chore at the appointed hour.  And following the sad example of the
destroyer transports at New Georgia in Toenails seven months before, the
Overton first landed her troops on the wrong island.

     At 0130, the Manley kicked up Kwajalein Island by radar.  At the same
time the Overton logged seeing the glow of fires due to the bombing of the
island.  It was evident that the Japanese had not been able or had not tried
to darken ship (black out) in expectation of an assault.

     The destroyer transports got behind schedule by inching up to their
disembarkation positions about a mile from the beaches.  They did not begin
launching their landing craft for the reconnaissance parties and assault
troops until about 0341.  The current and off shore wind carried the destroyer
transports seaward nearly a thousand yards while they off loaded their troops
in the darkness and ocean swell.  The new moon had long since set.  At about
0423, the landing craft loaded with assault troops and rubber boats carrying
the reconnaissance parties in the tow of ships' motor boats were shoved off
for the beach.  With morning twilight due to begin at 0559, and sunrise due at
0712, this was a late start for an important mission.

Manley - Gea Island

     The craft from the Manley proceeded slowly toward the beach, delayed by
wind and sea and the holding of several conferences enroute as to which of the
dark island silhouettes ahead was Gea Island.

     When about one-quarter mile off the beach, during one of these dark
conferences, previous plans to shift the rubber boat party to an electric
powered raft for an offshore reconnaissance and report back to the assault
party were abandoned, because of the fast approaching dawn.  At 0547 - just 12
minutes before dawn - the reconnaissance party from the Manley was logged as
making an unopposed landing on Gea Island.  The island was reported captured
before noon.

Overton - Ninni Island

     The craft from the Overton' wrestled with the same wind, sea, and
identification problems as had those from the Manley.  The tail end members of
the Overton assault party were logged as having landed at a late 0603 - four
minutes after morning twilight had broken.  By 0627, a red light had been
displayed on the island and logged aboard ship, and then it was quickly noted
that the light was on the wrong island.  The Navy had landed the troops on
Gehh Island, the next island northwest from Ninni Island.  It was 0700 and
broad daylight before the party on Gehh Island discovered they were on the
wrong island.  It was 0721 before the TBS logs show this fact reported to Rear
Admiral Turner, and 0810 before the movement to the correct destination, Ninni
Island, was begun and promptly executed.

     After the event, the Overton reported she and her boat officers enroute
beachward had had difficulty identifying Ninni Island, her landing target,
initially because of the similarity on radar of the two islands and later due
to the sameness of their dark silhouettes.  The disturbing fact, however, is
that on the radar screen and on the charts there are four islands in the
general area of Gea Pass.  Ninni and Gea are the two islands in the center
close together with Gehh and Ennylabegan well separated to the left and right
respectively, and Gea the smallest of all.

     By 1235 Ninni Island had been reported secured, although the flagship,
Overton, did not log this good word until 1400.

     Things had gone much better on Gea.  At 1130 Gea Island was reported
secured.

     Although the Overton does not mention the unsatisfactory landing beaches,
the skipper of the Manley logged:

Commanding Officer of the Overton said three of his landing boats were wrecked
on the beach and wanted to use two of the Maitley's.  Against my better
judgment, I sent him two boats.

     There were no Japanese on Ninni Island where the Overton was supposed to
land her troops but there were 130 Japanese on Gehh Island where she did land
them.  So it was a double complication to land unintentionally on Gehh Island.

     Before all the Japanese had been subdued on Gehh Island, it was necessary
for the Overton to fire her 3-inch guns for about 10 minutes in close fire
support on 1 February 1944.

     Our losses in securing Gehh, Ninni, and Gea Islands were initially
reported as two dead and two wounded, a remarkably small number for wiping out
150 Japanese and securing a vital entrance into Kwajalein lagoon.  The chore
was over and done on Gea and Ninni by midafternoon on 1 February.

Southern Attack Force Landings On Ennylabegan (Carlos) and Enubuj (Carlson)

     The daylight Dog Day landings on Carlson and Carlos Islands were to
ensure the provision of artillery support for the main assault landing on
Kwajalein Island, scheduled for the next day.  Additionally, the longer of
these two 300-yard-wide islands, Carlos, rising out of the reef some seven
miles northwest of Kwajalein, was considered suitable for supply dumps and
repair stations during the main assault.

     The Advance Transport Unit, under Captain J. B. McGovern, was told off
for this Dog Day task with the 17th Regimental Combat Team and sixty pieces of
artillery from the Seventh Infantry Division.  Making up the sixty weapons
were forty eight 105-millimeter and twelve 155-millimeter (6.1), all of which
were to be emplaced on Carlson Island just two miles from Kwajalein.

     At Makin and Tarawa, the troops on the transports had off-loaded into
LCVP's which then sought the correct amtrac which only minutes before had been
launched from an LST.  The troops then boarded the amtracs to ride into their
assault beaches.

     At Kwajalein on Dog Day, a modified procedure was used.  The transports
transferred the assault troops to the designated LST by LCVP.  The troops then
climbed aboard the correct amtrac in the LST tank deck and then the LST's
launched the fully manned amtracs through the bow doors.  This change was made
on the basis that it would be much easier to locate a bulley LST in the dark
than an individual low freeboard LVT.

     However, in the dark of the night of 31 January 1944, the LST's of the
Advance Transport Unit (Tractor Unit One) could not locate in the Troop
Transfer Area the particular transport which they had been ordered to lie to
nearby.  The Troop Transfer Area was an unmarked strip of ocean five to en
miles west of Gea Pass.

     At 0544 the flagship of the transports was ready, willing and able to
commence the transfer of troops, and the signal "Land the Landing Force" was
promulgated by Commander Southern Attack Force (CTF 52), but it was not until
well after 0605, dawn having started to break at 0559 (at which time CTF 52
had ordered all the transports to turn on their identification signal lights),
that the LST's started drawing close aboard to their correct transports.  The
last LST to do this was the LST-272 logged as arriving at 0650, after having
been delayed by a steering engine failure at the crucial minute.

     Long before the 0712 sunrise, the Fire Support Group was thundering away
at Kwajalein, the old battleships Pennsylvania and Mississippi having opened
fire at 0618.  At the same time the four destroyers of Fire Support Units One
and Four were shelling both Carlos and Carlson with over two thousand 5-inch
shells; the New Orleans was dropping 8-inch shells on Carlson.  Ten minutes
before sunrise, about 0702, the first of the assault troop transfers to the
LST-224 had been completed, and she headed for the Line of Departure ready to
launch her 17 amtracs against Yellow Beach on Carlson.  The underlying, long
ocean swell, with its top whipped into a healthy chop by the steady wind,
coupled with the fact that some of the LST's had rigged only one rope net for
the troops to climb aboard on, made the troop transfer a slow one.  When this
was combined with inadequate frapping lines to hold the landing craft close to
the sides of the LST's while unloading, the short minutes of dawn slipped by
all too fast.

     The last LST was logged moving out of the Troop Transfer Area to her
launching position at a late 0745.  It had long been apparent that the Navy
again was not going to meet its appointed How Hour, 0830, for putting the
troops ashore.  At 0725, Commander Advance Transport Unit (Captain McGovern)
reported to CTF 52 (Rear Admiral Turner) that he was running 30 minutes late.
Guided by the experience at Tarawa, CTF 52 at 0748, set How Hour back not 30
minutes but 40 minutes, to 0910.  At 0810, Fire Support Units One and Four
commenced their pre-assault landing bombardment of Carlos and Carlson.  The
new battleship Washington had bombarded the islands the previous day.

     This time communication channels were open to the naval aviators from the
escort carriers and they were alerted to the change in How Hour and carried
out their scheduled air strike on CARLOS Island, commencing at 0858.
According to the Joint Amphibious Force report:

Scheduled fires and air strikes in support of these landings were executed
exactly on time . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

There was a constant curtain of heavy offensive fire laid down by naval
ships of the fire support group and by aircraft.

     White Beach Two on Carlos Island was in a cove near the northwestern end
of the island and the Line of Departure was 3,000 yards west of Harvey Point,
the northwestern end of Carlos.

     Yellow Beach Two on Carlson Island stretched across most of the
northwestern end of the island.

     The first of the four assault waves of amtracs for each island left the
Line of Departure at 0851, followed on schedule by the next three waves.  The
12 LCI's converted to LCI(FS)'s provided close-in fire support, six at each
island.  The first wave landed on Carlos at 0910, and on Carlson at 0915.  The
latter landing was tardy but not disgracefully so.  The delay was reportedly
due to the breaking down of a drone boat planned for demolition of underwater
obstacles, and the necessity of clearing it out of the way of the advancing
amtracs.

Particularly noted was the effective manner which the LST's with LVT(A-2)'s
accomplished this landing operation.  There was no difficulty in launching
them or in their beaching over the harsh coral reefs surrounding the islands.
The fire support by 40mm, rockets and .50 cal. observed coming from special
LCI's who went close in to the beach with attack waves, seemed very effective
and was impressively mentioned by personnel of the Army who went ashore.

     The actual landings on White Beach Two on Carlos Island were unopposed at
the landing beach.  With due effort, 26 Japanese were flushed out, killed or
captured, and at 1615 the island was reported secured without loss of life.

     The assault waves were also unopposed on Carlson.  The island was
reported captured by 1210, likewise without loss of life, although as many as
125 Japanese and Koreans were reported killed or captured.

     Before dark, the Army artillery was all ashore and the first landed of
the 105-millimeter (4.1") were logged at an early 1353 as shooting at
Kwajalein Island.  The first artillery had been smartly landed only an hour
before, at 1253, and rapidly and proficiently emplaced.

     A major logistic support effort was required at Carlson by DUKWs
outloaded from three beached LST's to keep these busy guns adequately supplied
with ammunition.  However, these willing guns fired harassing fire on
Kwajalein throughout the night of 31 January - 1 February and a total of
29,000 rounds in preparation for and during the assault landing on Kwajalein.

Minesweeping

     While no Japanese minefields were known to have been layed in the
southern half of Kwajalein Lagoon, it was still necessary to clearly establish
this fact by minesweeping, or to know the boundaries of any located mine
fields, before sending gunfire support ships through Gea Pass to provide close
support for the troops landing on the west beaches of Kwajalein Island.

     Since photographic reconnaissance had located no fixed guns on either Gea
or Ninni Island, it was not considered necessary that these islands guarding
Gea Pass be secured before thin skinned minesweepers were ordered through the
pass.

     At 0638 the minesweeping unit was directed to proceed into the lagoon to
commence sweeping, and at 0734, the flagship Revenge passed Ninni Island abeam
and headed into the lagoon.

     No mines were located in the main anchorage in the southern lagoon or in
Gea Pass but later a few horned-type anchored mines were swept up in other
passes into the lagoon.

     The Revenge claimed her place in naval history by entering in her War
Diary that she was:

the first U.S. Naval surface vessel to enter into a Japanese harbor that had
not been captured by them but which had been under their control prior to the
beginning of the war.

     At 1508 Commander Minesweeping Group was logged coming aboard the Rocky
Mount to report no mines in any of the anchorage area that we needed for
immediate use.

     By nightfall, Transport Division Four, Fire Support Unit One, Fire
Support Unit Four, the LCI gunboats, the LST's and several large attack cargo
ships were all safely inside the lagoon within the mineswept anchorage.  The
waters of the lagoon were not smooth, but they were smoother than those
outside and more suitable for unloading cargo.  And best of all, the ships
were free of submarine worries.

     About 1700 on Dog Day, Major General Corlett, Commander Southern Landing
Force, shifted his forward echelon command post to Carlson, preparatory for
the big tomorrow.

A Big Plus for Dog Day

     The biggest plus on Dog Day for the Southern Attack Force was the capture
of a portfolio of about 75 Japanese secret charts covering the Marshalls and
Caroline Islands, as well as selected secret charts of ports in the Marianas,
Bonins, and of major naval ports in Japan.  These were recovered from a
Japanese tugboat stranded on the lagoon side of Gehh Island, the island where
our troops had been landed in error by the Advance Transport Unit.  If not for
this mistaken landing in the early dawn perhaps the tugboat personnel might
have destroyed their gold mine of hydrographic information.

     As a result of this find, orders for a complete hydrographic survey by
our minesweepers of Kwajalein Lagoon were cancelled.  The Japanese charts were
translated, depth converted to fathoms from meters, redrafted and reproduced
in time to be given to ships participating in the Catchpole Operation against
Eniwetok ten days later.  Additionally, from the same tugboat a great number
of code books and recognition signals were among the captured documents.

Southern Attack Force - The Main Assault:  Kwajalein

     Once started, all operations had gone quite well on Dog Day, so at 1638
on 31 January, CTF 52 advised Task Force 52 that the main assault landings
would be launched as planned at William Hour - 0930 - on 1 February 1944,
against Beach Red One and Beach Red Two on Kwajalein Island.

     During Dog Day at about 1000 (high tide) and again about 1600 (low tide),
the men from the Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) in four LCVP's in the
morning and in four amtracs in the afternoon had taken a close look at the
approaches to the main landing beaches on the western end of Kwajalein Island,
while the reef-hugging battleships maintained a continuous fire against the
western beaches of Kwajalein.  The Japanese seemed unaware of what was taking
place. The UDTs carried out their reconnaissance largely as planned and found
neither underwater obstacles nor antiboat mines off the assault beaches and,
even more luckily, were not fired upon during the morning reconnaissance.

     Throughout the daylight of Dog Day, the Fire Support Group worked over
the defenses of Kwajalein, each ship having a fair share of specified Japanese
defense objectives.  Before the day was out, the Mississippi and Pennsylvania
had closed the beach to within 1,500 yards to knock down the concrete pillars
fronting the landing beaches.

     Some 7,000 projectiles were fired against Kwajalein on 31 January 1944,
by the four gallant old battleships (Pennsylvania, Idaho, New Mexico, and
Mississippi), the three heavy cruisers and 11 destroyers of the Fire Support
Group of the Southern Attack Force.  The battleships did most of their
bombardment at moderate ranges of about 12,000 yards, although some of it
"close-up."  The effect was both impressive to the onlooker and more
importantly, effective, as these extracts from official reports indicate:

The bombardment was practically continuous on 31 January from 0812 to 1730 and
on 1 February from 0615 to 1400.  In addition the New Mexico and the Murray
fired night interdiction the night of 31 January from 2020 to 0500.

                  *         *         *         *         *

As tracer ammunition streaked through the dark tropic night from Carlson to
Kwajalein and from the ships to Burton [Ebeye] Island the scene resembled a
gigantic battle of small boys with Roman candles, with terrific explosions
shattering the silence and many fires blazing up to reveal a scene of complete
desolation.

                  *         *         *         *         *

At Kwajalein, a battleship was shelling the beach in preparation for the
landing.  The Admiral was not satisfied with the effect and particularly so in
that the battleship was hesitant in closing the range.  In much anger, he
signalled to the general effect:  'Why should you with your 12" guns be afraid
of the enemy's 6" cannon?  Close the range to 1500 yards'.

Dog Day Air Bombardment

     The naval air bombardment of Kwajalein Island had been curtailed on the
afternoon of Dog Day due to foul flying weather, of which a low cloud ceiling
and rain squalls were the main ingredients.  However, Carrier Task Group 58.1,
with Enterprise, Yorktown and Belleau Wood, and Carrier Support Group 52.9,
with Manila Bay, Coral Sea, and Corregidor had flown 102 bombing sorties over
Kwajalein Island before their operations were called off.

     The result of air and gun bombardment was to fill the island with bomb
craters and shell holes, wreck nearly all structures and scatter them around,
uproot the palms and destroy all the foliage, and to make it difficult for men
or vehicles to move very rapidly from here to there because of rubble and
holes.

Landing the Assault Waves - Kwajalein

     The assault troops were ferried from the large transports to the LST's
during daylight on Dog Day, and so were all ready to climb aboard their
amtracs and be launched through the bow doors of the eight LST's early on Dog
Day plus one.

     Morning was just breaking, when, according to the Minneapolis TBS Log, at
0601 on Dog Day plus one, 1 February 1944, Captain Knowles, Commander
Transport Group and veteran of Guadalcanal and Tarawa, was ordered by the big
boss, Rear Admiral Turner, "To take charge and 'Land the Landing Force.'"

     This signal to a subordinate to "take charge" was sent because Rear
Admiral Turner had learned through experience in Watchtower, Toenails and
Galvanic that the actual landing operations must be placed squarely upon the
shoulders of the Transport Group Commander.  However, the Transport Group
Commander still lacked adequate rank, a flagship with proper communication
facilities, and more importantly, an ample and trained staff.

     Commander Southern Transport Group, who noted in his report that he had
received 55 directives, orders, and memoranda relative to Flintlock, began his
chores in the midst of an avalanche of efforts by others.  His superior's
Action Report noted:

. . . smoke from fires on the beach, smoke from ships' gunfire, and dust and
debris from explosions almost obscured the western end of the island.  From
this time on, until the first wave landed, air strikes by carrier planes and
Army B-24 heavy bombers, and scheduled fires by surface ships were carried out
exactly on schedule in a magnificent demonstration of accurate timing and
coordination.

     The lack of any semblance of Japanese gunfire towards the Transport Area
permitted the LST's to launch their amtracs about 7,500 yards from the beach
and the amtracs to move up to the Line of Departure 5,000 yards from Red Beach
One and Red Beach Two with a minimum of confusion, delay, and apprehension.

     How Hour on Kwajalein was 0930 and for a change the Navy made it on time.
The 84 new amtracs LVT-25 and LVT-A (1) (tanks) made the two and a half miles
from the Line of Departure at a speed of five knots despite the considerable
swell which was wetting down the troops, and making them anxious to be on dry
land.

     Regimental Combat Team 184 was on the left flank and Regimental Combat
Team 32 was on the right flank, both from the Seventh Infantry Division.  Wave
One had 16 amtracs carrying troops and 16 amphibious tanks.  The early waves
were supported by the fire support LCI's and shepherded by LCC's (Landing
Craft Control) on each flank.  The wave Space was four minutes, and the four
amtrac waves all arrived on or ahead of time and landed without casualties.

     Born of the confidence engendered in Galvanic, big ship and destroyer
gunfire support this time continued until two minutes before touchdown of the
amtracs, when the gunfire lifted inland.  The LCI(FS)'s opened with their
rockets at 1,100 yards from the beach, and let go their second salvo when only
800 yards offshore.  They continued firing their machine guns up to the last
minute before the troops reached the beach.  Added to this rain of small
gunfire, the amphibious tanks which numbered 16 in the lead wave added their
best firing efforts.

     The pesky current tended to set the amtracs towards the south, but as far
as is known, all landed on their designated beaches although bunched toward
the southern half of both Red Beach One and Red Beach Two.

     As was later reported:

The first wave landed on schedule, exactly 0930.  Surf was light and no
obstacles or mines were encountered on the reef or beach . . . .  Our troops
advanced to the eastward along the long axis of the island a distance of about
1300 yards . . . .  About 11,000 troops, 42 medium tanks and 6 light tanks
fitted with flame throwers, in addition to adequate supply of ammunition, food
and water were landed on Kwajalein the first day of the main landing.

                  *         *         *         *         *

The LST-LVT assault team worked smoothly again and these LVT's had no great
difficulties in surmounting the coral reefs on Red Beach 1 and 2.  Army
personnel were impressed by the quality and quantity of Naval gunfire.

     At 0940 just before the fourth amtrac wave was landing, the Beachmasters
at both Red Beach One and Red Beach Two reported that hydrographic conditions
in the beach approaches were such that troops in the LCVP waves would have to
be transferred to amtracs for expeditious landing, since the LCVP's would not
be able to get close to the shore before grounding.  A rendezvous 700-800
yards off the beaches was arranged.  Many, many transfers were carried out.
In general, LCM's stranded about a hundred yards from the beach line and the
tanks made it from there in on their own, but an unfortunate few were drowned
out.

     Despite these handicaps, the landing of the assault troops, their tanks,
equipment, and logistic support proceeded steadily.  No land mines were
encountered in the immediate beach area.

     By noon on 2 February, logistic support was being landed generally over
Blue Beach One or Green Beach Four, rather than over the Red beaches.  Before
dark that day, all logistic support was going ashore over lagoon beaches or by
transshipment to LVT's.

     The Kwajalein lagoon beaches were no bargain basement for large landing
craft, as the Commander of an LST Group reported:

Beaching conditions are bad.  Coral heads are plentiful.  Ships standing in to
beach invariably ground on a coral head with 18 feet of water all around.  As
tide ebbs, the coral punctures the bottom.  The pontoon causeways carried by
the LST's proved invaluable.  Without them, unloading would have been a
serious problem.

     Many LCM's also had their bottoms Punctured by coral heads.  The short
steep choppy seas inside the lagoon slowed boats down tremendously and gave
their crews a drubbing.  Everything inside these craft was wet, including
crews, passengers, and cargo.

     Despite these logistic support slowdowns, the landing operation went
well.  As Commander Southern Transport Group reported:

Dispositions listed in the Landing Attack Order No. 2-44 were closely
followed.  The plan was executed as written, with minor unimportant variations
and worked well.

Slow But Steady Advance

     The troops ashore moved ahead steadily.  Their progress was slowed by the
"resist to the death tactics" of the brave Japanese and by a sound desire to
avoid heavy casualties.

     The seagoing amphibians' task of air, gunfire, and logistic support
continued at Kwajalein until midafternoon, 4 February, when the island was
reported secure.

     That afternoon, Rear Admiral Turner broadcast by TBS:

Commander Task Force Fifty-Two has the pleasure to announce that our troops of
the 7th Army Division completed capture of Kwajalein Island at 1525 today.

Naval Gunfire Support

     The Army was pleased with the naval gunfire support received, and
thereafter was the staunch advocate of seagoing artillery, as this section of
the Seventh Infantry's report indicates:

Reports from the various Infantry Battalion Commanders indicate that without
exception, all call fire missions were handled properly and to the complete
satisfaction of all supported units.

It has been estimated by the Commanding General, Seventh Infantry Division
Artillery, that eighty percent of the destruction done to heavily fortified
positions was a direct result of Naval gunfire.

The Naval report was equally enthusiastic:

These islands showed nothing but devastation.  All emplacements or shelters
above ground had evidence of hits or were completely destroyed.  The entire
island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet then dropped.  The
devastation on the landing beach was so great that it was almost impossible
for tanks to cross the beach.  All beach defenses were completely destroyed.
It was almost impossible to tell where the sea wall around a portion of the
beach had stood.

     In all, 3,926 tons of naval shells were fired by the Southern Attack
Force and 2,667 tons by the Northern Attack Force.

     By 5 February 1944, the few Japanese left alive on Kwajalein Island were
killed, had committed suicide, or were captured.

     The Japanese had had a small craft repair base on North Gugewe,
storehouses and ammunition dumps on Bigej, besides the seaplane base on Ebeye.
These and all other islands in the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll were
cleared out by nightfall of 5 February.

Mission Accomplished

     By this date, the future Secretary of the Navy, James W. Forrestal, had
personally visited Kwajalein and had said he was more than pleased with what
had been accomplished.

     Departure of ships from Kwajalein Atoll for the South Pacific began on 4
February.  By 6 February, one headquarters ship, 13 attack transports, four
attack cargo ships, and three landing ships (dock) with 216 amtracs screened
by seven destroyers had departed for early scheduled operations in the South
Pacific.

     On 25 February 1944, Rear Admiral Turner departed Kwajalein Atoll for
Pearl, with one more victory notch in his belt.

     As he headed for the barn, Rear Admiral Turner wrote:

Overemphasis of certain problems which experience at Tarawa had exaggerated
in the minds of those concerned had caused general doubt regarding the
effectiveness of our weapons and tactics, and much time and effort was
expended on dubious and fruitless schemes.

     More importantly he wrote:

The practical cooperative spirit manifested toward each other by the officers
and men of all Services and arms is above praise, and should inspire optimism
and confidence in the future of our combined arms.

     A Marine officer who served first on the Staff of Major General Holland
M. Smith, USMC, and then on the Staff of Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral)
Turner wrote of the latter:

I truly saw him in action, night and day, afloat and ashore.  Admiral Turner
had an almost unbelievable capacity for work.  He drove himself without mercy,
and he expected and demanded the same of those around him.  I never saw him
relax or take his ease.